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NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA:
AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S
CONSISTENT APPLICATION AND INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF
THE STANDARD AFTER
GADSON V. ECO SERVICES OF SOUTH CAROLINA, INC.
1. INTRODUCTION
The tort of negligent entrustment embodies a basic principle based on both
property and tort law: with a right of control comes a corresponding duty to
exercise that control with due care;' "[c]onversely, one who has no control owes no
duty."2 The Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) recognizes this control
principle and provides for liability where an entrustor has the right to control a
thing, an activity, or a chattel and negligently entrusts it to a person who is likely
to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others.' This principle makes sense-the
person with control of the chattel has the unique power to prevent injury to third
parties by using due care in entrustment.4 Though South Carolina has recognized
this principle in terms of entrustment of chattel for many years,' the South Carolina
Supreme Court recently declined to adopt the Restatement sections for negligent
entrustment in Gadson v. ECO Services of South Carolina, Inc. 6 Unfortunately, the
court's decision was based on a very narrow statement of the standard of negligent
entrustment in cases involving an intoxicated driver The South Carolina Court of
Appeals first articulated this narrow standard in McAllister v. Graham':
The test of liability here under the theory of negligent
entrustment is (1) knowledge of or knowledge imputable to the
owner that the driver was either addicted to intoxicants or had the
habit of drinking, (2) that the owner knew or had imputable
knowledge that the driver was likely to drive while intoxicated
1. Miller v. City of Camden, 329 S.C. 310, 314, 494 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1997) (citing Dunbar v.
Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co., 211 S.C. 209,216,44 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1947): Peden v. Furman Univ., 155
S.C. 1, 16, 151 S.E. 907, 912 (1930)); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 330, at 894
(2000); F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 111 (3d ed.
2004) ("[T]he owner/occupier [ofland] cannot be held liable if he does not in fact control the dangerous
condition and thus could not make it safer.").
2. Miller, 329 S.C. at 314, 494 S.E.2d at 815 (citing Clark v. Greenville County, 313 S.C. 205,
210, 437 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1993)).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 308, 390 (1965).
4. See, e.g., HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 1, at 7 ("[T]he focus of the concern for avoiding
injuries is on efficient accident prevention.").
5. See, e.g., Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621, 274 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1981)
("The theory of negligent entrustment provides: 'the owner or one in control of the vehicle and
responsible for its use who is negligent in entrusting it to another can be held liable... ." (quoting
Bahm v. Dormanen, 543 P.2d 379, 381 (Mont. 1975)) (emphasis added)); see also cases cited infra
notes 19 20.
6. 374 S.C. 171, 177, 648 S.E.2d 585, 588 (2007).
7. Id at 176-77, 648 S.E.2d at 588 (citing Jackson v. Price, 288 S.C. 377, 381-82, 342 S.E.2d
628, 631 (Ct. App. 1986)).
8. 287 S.C. 455, 458, 339 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1986).
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and (3) under these circumstances, the entrustment of a vehicle by
the owner to such a driver.9
Though the supreme court correctly decided Gadson based on its facts, the court's
narrow standard is troubling because it is inconsistent with many prior South
Carolina negligent entrustment cases and with the general principle that the right
to control imposes a corresponding duty to use due care in the exercise of that
control. This inconsistency could present serious doctrinal problems in the future.
This Note reviews the elements of negligent entrustment in South Carolina and
addresses the underlying theory guiding its application. Part 11 analyzes South
Carolina decisions involving negligent entrustment and shows that the courts have
used a theory of negligent entrustment consistent with the Restatement in many
types of cases, including those not involving an intoxicated driver. Part 11 also
discusses the broader concept of the duty to prevent a third party from using a
chattel and analyzes the first party limitation on negligent entrustment. Part III
analyzes the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Gadson and discusses the
court's decision not to adopt Restatement sections 308 and 390 in light of prior
caselaw. Part IV examines the public policies behind South Carolina's negligent
entrustment analysis and argues that the Restatement standard furthers policy goals
emphasized by the supreme court. Finally, Part V concludes that South Carolina's
cases are consistent with the Restatement's standard, and as a result, the South
Carolina Supreme Court should adopt the standard and limit the narrow doctrinal
statements in Gadson to its facts.
11. SOUTH CAROLINA'S NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT DECISIONS
A. Introduction
In negligent entrustment cases, "the duty of care is not imposed.., unless the
defendant has the right to control the chattel."' When a court finds that the
defendant owed a duty, "the negligent entrustment case is an ordinary negligence
case to which all the principles of negligence law apply." ' 1 Thus, if a defendant had
control of a particular chattel, liability for the entrustment of that chattel depends
on whether the facts constitute a breach of the defendant's duty of due care. For
example, courts typically apply this principle in cases of "negligent entrustment of
an automobile or a weapon" to a person a defendant knows or should know is likely
to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to oneself and others.
12
The Restatement provides a general statement of this accepted standard of
liability for negligent entrustment. Section 308 provides as follows:
9. Id. (citing Passmore, 275 S.C. at 621, 274 S.E.2d at 418; Nettles v. Your Ice Co., 191 S.C. 429,
436 38, 4 S.E.2d 797, 799 800 (1939)).
10. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 330, at 894; see supra text accompanying notes 1 2. This duty might
require due care in entrusting the chattel, supervision after entrustment-for example, when a child is
entrusted with a rifle or prevention ofmisuse by a foreseeable third party. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 330,
at 893 94.
11. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 330, at 893 (citing Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 355 56 (Colo.
1992); Olguin v. City of Burley, 810 P.2d 255, 258 (Idaho 1991)).
12. Id. (citations omitted).
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It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage
in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor
knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use
the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as
to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. 3
Section 390 states a "special application of the rule stated in § 308"'" to cases
involving entrustment of a chattel to a person the entrustor knows to be
incompetent. This section provides as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to
know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or
otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of
physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should
expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to
liability for physical harm resulting to them.15
The Restatement emphasizes the element of control as essential to negligent
entrustment 16 and notes that, although these sections most frequently apply "where
the third person is a member of a class which is notoriously likely to misuse the
thing [entrusted]," they also apply where "the peculiar circumstances ofthe case are
such as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person may misuse"
the entrusted chattel.
17
South Carolina's negligent entrustment cases are consistent with the
Restatement standard.'" More specifically, the cases apply the principle of negligent
entrustment to a wide range of situations, 19 including the entrustment of chattel
other than automobiles.20 The cases show that a defendant's right to control a
chattel imposes a duty of due care either (1) to prevent chattel from falling into the
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965).
14. Id. § 390 cmt. b.
15. Id. § 390.
16. See id. § 308 cmt. a ("The words 'under the control of the actor' are used to indicate that the
third person is entitled to possess or use the thing or engage in the activity only by the consent of the
actor....").
17. Id. § 308 cmt. b.
18. In a first party negligent entrustment case, the court of appeals stated that the "Restatement
is a correct statement of the amalgamation of [negligent entrustment] cases decided in South Carolina."
Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376, 385, 540 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 355 S.C. 36, 583
S.E.2d 750 (2003) (emphasis added). In reversing, the supreme court declined to adopt sections 308 and
390 "based on this set of facts," Lydia, 355 S.C. at 43, 583 S.E.2d at 754, but it stated that comment c
to section 390 "is consistent" with its decision to bar first party negligent entrustment claims, id. at 40
n.2, 583 S.E.2d at 753 n.2.
19. See, e.g., Howell v. Hairston, 261 S.C. 292, 296, 199 S.E.2d 766, 767-68 (1973) (parent-
child); Pfaehler v. Ten Cent Taxi Co., 198 S.C. 476, 479, 18 S.E.2d 331, 332-33 (1942) (employer-
employee); Mitchell v. Bazzle, 304 S.C. 402, 405, 404 S.E.2d 910, 912 (Ct. App. 1991) (landlord-
tenant).
20. See, e.g., Howell, 261 S.C. at 292, 199 S.E.2d at 766 (air rifle); Dennis v. Timmons, 313 S.C.
338, 338, 437 S.E.2d 138, 139 (Ct. App. 1993) (screwdriver); Mitchell, 304 S.C. at 403, 404 S.E.2d at
910 (land with a dangerous dog).
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hands of an incompetent third party (safeguarding cases),2 or (2) to not permit a
third party's use of a chattel (the Restatement's standard).2 While the duty to
safeguard a chattel from use by a person who might cause harm is different from
the Restatement standard, it is closely related and indicates the correlation between
a defendant's right to control an object and the duty of due care in entrustment.23
Thus, the safeguarding cases support the argument that South Carolina courts
should use the Restatement approach for cases where a defendant entrusts a chattel
to another who is likely to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
B. Cases Using a Broad Test Based on a Defendant's Right to Control a
Chattel
1. Motor Vehicles
The earliest South Carolina case to recognize negligent entrustment is Nettles
v. Your Ice Co.24 In Nettles, Whatley worked for Your Ice Company (Your Ice) for
several years before the company fired him for habitually drinking alcohol at
work.2" Shortly thereafter, the company rehired Whatley as a delivery truck driver.26
Nettles, another employee, accompanied Whatley on a delivery one evening.2 7
Whatley and Nettles bought some liquor, and Whatley continued to drink as they
made their final delivery. 2' Afterwards, Whatley drank to excess at two bars but
insisted on driving.29 On the way home, Whatley drove the truck off the road and
it turned over, injuring Nettles.3"
Nettles received a jury verdict in his negligence suit against Your Ice." He
"based [his complaint] upon the alleged reckless and wilful act" of Your Ice in
allowing Whatley to drive a vehicle on a public highway knowing Whatley
frequently drank "to excess."32 Based on this statement of negligent entrustment,
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that
Your Ice "consciously failed to exercise due care for the protection and safety of
21. See Wineglass v. McMinn, 235 S.C. 537, 541, 112 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1960); Pfaehler, 198 S.C.
at 484-86, 18 S.E.2d at 335; Dennis, 313 S.C. at 341, 437 S.E.2d at 140-41.
22. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 1, § 330, at 893 ("[1]fharm is foreseeable, liability is appropriate
not only when the defendant intentionally 'entrusts' the chattel to a dangerous person but also when he
negligently leaves the chattel at a place where he should expect that a dangerous person is likely to find
and use it." (citing Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395, 404-05 (Pa. 1957))).
23. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Tort Liability for IntentionalActs of Family Members: Will Your
Insurer Stand by You?, 68 TENN. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2000) (citing DOBBS, supra note 1, § 330, at 893)
(" [T]he [chattel] owner's failure to exercise due care in safeguarding a dangerous object and negligently
allowing it to fall into the hands of another who might cause harm is also a species of negligent
entrustment.").
24. 191 S.C. 429, 4 S.E.2d 797 (1939).
25. Id. at 436, 4 S.E.2d at 799.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 432, 4 S.E.2d at 797-98.
28. Id. at 432 33, 4 S.E.2d at 798.
29. Id. at 433 34, 4 S.E.2d at 798.
30. Id. at 434, 4 S.E.2d at 798.
31. Id. at 432, 4 S.E.2d at 797.
32. Id. at 434 35, 4 S.E.2d at 798 99.
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others."33 Nettles illustrates the supreme court's early emphasis on a defendant's
right to control an entrusted chattel and the defendant's corresponding duty of due
care. Because Your Ice knew Whatley was likely to drive the truck in a manner
involving an unreasonable risk of harm to himself and others, the company
breached its duty of due care in entrusting its vehicle to him. 4
Then, in Pfaehler v. Ten Cent Taxi Co.,3" the South Carolina Supreme Court
held a taxi company liable for its employee's negligent act of leaving the car keys
in the taxi with an extremely intoxicated person who later injured the plaintiff. 6
Rose, the taxi driver, agreed to pick up a passenger, Varn, at a bar.37 Rose found
Varn intoxicated to the point that "he was almost passed out," so he placed him in
the passenger's seat. 8 A bar employee indicated that Rose had a phone call inside,
so Rose left Varn in the taxi with the key in the ignition.39 When Rose returned,
Varn had driven off with the taxi which he later drove into the Pfaehlers' car,
injuring the Pfaehlers.4 °
The supreme court found Rose negligent "in making it possible for [Vain] to
take charge of the car and drive it away."'" Further, the court stated that Rose's
decision to leave his ignition key in the car and the drunk passenger in the front seat
instead of the "back seat, where he would probably put a man who he thought was
so drunk that he would be asleep," was "the initial act of negligence which set in
motion the chain of events which culminated in the collision with Mr. Pfaehler's
car."42 In support of its ruling, the court cited the principle that where one actor
causes an initial wrong and an intervening actor does further harm, the initial actor
is liable for all ensuing consequences if that actor set the intervening cause in
motion.43 Thus, the "test is to be found in the probable injurious consequences
which were to be anticipated, not in the number of subsequent events" that arise.44
This language illustrates the decision's underlying principle: because Rose had the
right to control the taxi, he had a duty of due care to anticipate and prevent third
party use of it. Thus, this is the first South Carolina case to impose a duty on a
person to safeguard a chattel from use by another who is likely to cause harm.4"
Rose breached this duty because Rose should have known of Varn's likelihood to
33. Id. at 437,4 S.E.2d at 799. However, the court found that Nettles was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law and reversed the jury verdict. Id. at 438-40, 4 S.E.2d at 800-01.
34. This case is consistent with the Restatement section 390. "A lends his car to his friend B for
B to use to drive a party of friends to a country club dance. A knows that B has habitually become
intoxicated at such dances. On the particular occasion B becomes intoxicated and while in that condition
recklessly drives the car into the carefully driven car of C, and causes harm to him. A is subject to
liability to C." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. b, illus. 4 (1965).
35. 198 S.C. 476, 18 S.E.2d 331 (1942).
36. Id. at 486 87, 18 S.E.2d at 336.
37. Id. at 479-80, 18 S.E.2d at 333.
38. Id. at 480, 18 S.E.2d at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 481 82, 18 S.E.2d at 333 34.
40. Id. at 480, 482, 18 S.E.2d at 332, 333 34.
41. Id. at 485, 18 S.E.2d at 335-36.
42. Id. at 484-85, 18 S.E.2d at 335.
43. Id. at 486, 18 S.E.2d at 335 (quoting 22 RULING CASE LAW § 19, at 134-35 (William M.
McKinney et al. eds., (1929)).
44. Id. (quoting RULING CASE LAW, supra note 43, § 19, at 135) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45. See supra notes 21 23 and accompanying text.
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drive the vehicle in an intoxicated state, and yet he still failed to take reasonable
steps to prevent Varn from doing so and thus injuring others.
In Howle v. McDaniel,46 another early negligent entrustment case, the South
Carolina Supreme Court addressed negligent entrustment in the context of a bailor-
bailee relationship.4 In this case, Brown, an employee of Howle, often took
Howle's car home at night for travel to and from work.48 The battery in Howle's car
was old and "weak," resulting in the headlights dimming as the car started.49
Addtionally, Howle instructed Brown not to use the car at night and required
Brown to ask his permission to use the car for other jobs.50 On the night of the
accident, Brown needed help from Rogers, a friend he was visiting, in push-starting
the car.5 ' The evidence was contradictory as to whether the headlights on Howle's
car were working properly. 52 Brown saw McDaniel's car coming toward him and
pulled over to the side of the road, but McDaniel struck Howle's car, causing
Brown personal injury."
When Howle sued McDaniel for the damage to his car, McDaniel made a
counterclaim for the personal injuries he suffered "as the result of Brown's
negligent operation" of Howle's car.54 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's directed verdict against Howle5 ' but stated that a bailor may be
liable to a third person injured by the bailed property "where he has entrusted a
dangerous article to one whom he knows to be ignorant of its dangerous quality, or
an automobile to one whom he knows to be so reckless or incompetent that danger
to third persons would be a reasonably probable consequence" of its use. 6 In this
case, Howle was not negligent because even if Brown negligently operated the car,
Brown used the car most often and had better knowledge of the headlight
malfunction." Thus, although Howle owed a duty of due care in entrusting his car,
he did not breach his duty because he did not entrust his car to a person ignorant of
its dangerous quality or to a person that was reckless or incompetent. Importantly,
the court's language in this case is consistent with the Restatement standard for
negligent entrustment.
The duty to safeguard against third party use5 8 is also involved in Wineglass v.
McMinn.9 In Wineglass, the South Carolina Supreme Court held a company liable
for its employee's actions in leaving the ignition keys in a delivery truck and in
failing to anticipate and prevent his minor assistant from causing injury to others.60
Inman operated a delivery truck for the defendant company, owned by McMinn,
46. 232 S.C. 125, 101 S.E.2d 255 (1957).
47. Id. at 130-31, 101 S.E.2dat 257-58.
48. Id. at 129, 101 S.E.2d at 256 57.
49. Id. at 136, 101 S.E.2d at 261.
50. Id. at 130-31, 101 S.E.2dat 257-58.
51. Id. at 136, 101 S.E.2d at 261.
52. Id. at 136 37, 101 S.E.2d at 261.
53. Id. at 136, 101 S.E.2d at 261.
54. Id. at 128, 101 S.E.2d at 256.
55. Id. at 139, 101 S.E.2d at 262.
56. Id. at 132, 101 S.E.2d at 259.
57. Id. at 136 37, 101 S.E.2d at 261.
58. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
59. 235 S.C. 537, 112 S.E.2d 652 (1960).
60. Id. at 541, 112 S.E.2d at 654.
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and with its knowledge, Inman employed a fourteen-year-old assistant who did not
have a driver's license and who had never driven a truck.6' On the day of the
accident, Inman parked his truck behind the plaintiff Wineglass's station wagon,
leaving the ignition key and the minor in the truck.62 A third driver asked the minor
to move Inman's truck.63 The minor did so but lost control of the truck, pinning
Wineglass between the truck and his station wagon and causing him injuries.64
Wineglass's complaint alleged negligence in "leaving the motor vehicle.., in
the care of and attended by an unlicensed and inexperienced driver."6 In affirming
the jury verdict against McMinn, the court noted that "the obvious ground for
affirmance" was Inman's negligence "in leaving the inexperienced, fourteen-year-
old boy to attend the truck, with [the] ignition key in it, when [Inman] should have
foreseen as a reasonable and probable consequence ... that the safety of others on
the street would be endangered."66 The court cited Pfaehler for the controlling
principle that an actor is negligent in failing to safeguard against third party use of
chattel if the actor should have, in the exercise of due care, foreseen an intermediate
wrong.67 Thus, Inman's right to control the delivery truck imposed on him a duty
of due care. Because it was foreseeable that the minor assistant driving would cause
an unreasonable risk of harm, Inman breached his duty by failing to prevent his use
of the delivery truck.
In Tucker v. United States," another case involving an intoxicated driver, a
South Carolina federal district court applied the state's negligent entrustment law
and found the United States not liable for a motor pool dispatcher's entrustment of
an Army vehicle to a serviceman.69 The serviceman had "consumed two or three
beers and a shot of bourbon" within an hour of obtaining the vehicle7" and later
crashed into Tucker's car.7" Tucker alleged that the government negligently
entrusted the vehicle to the serviceman, contending "the dispatcher knew or should
have known [the serviceman] had been drinking alcoholic beverages."72
The district court cited the decisions of Wineglass, Howle, and Pfaehler for
"[t]he law of negligent entrustment in South Carolina."" It noted that Howle stands
for the proposition that "a bailor may be negligent when he entrusts an automobile
to one whom he knows to be so reckless or incompetent that danger to third persons
would be a reasonable [and] probable consequence."74 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that there was no evidence "that the
61. Id. at 539-40, 112 S.E.2d at 653.
62. Id. at 539, 112 S.E.2d at 653.
63. Id. at 539-40, 112 S.E.2d at 653.
64. Id. at 540, 112 S.E.2d at 653.
65. Id. at 540, 112 S.E.2d at 654.
66. Id. at 541, 112 S.E.2d at 654.
67. Id. (citing Pfaehlerv. Ten Cent Taxi Co., 198 S.C. 476, 485-86, 18 S.E.2d 331,335 (1942)).
68. 385 F. Supp. 717 (D.S.C. 1974).
69. Id. at 724 25.
70. Id. at 718.
71. Id. at 719-20.
72. Id. at 720.
73. Id. at 722 (citing Wineglass v. McMinn, 235 S.C. 537, 540-41, 112 S.E.2d 652, 653 54
(1960); Howle v. McDaniel, 232 S.C. 125, 132, 136-38, 101 S.E.2d 255,259, 261-62 (1957); Pfaehler
v. Ten Cent Taxi Co., 198 S.C. 476, 485-87, 18 S.E.2d 331, 335-36 (1942)).
74. Id. at 723 (citing Howle, 232 S.C. at 132, 101 S.E.2d at 259).
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dispatcher actually knew [the serviceman] was drinking .. . [or] was drunk,
reckless, or incompetent. 7 5 Thus, the government was not negligent in entrusting
the vehicle to the serviceman because the evidence did not establish that it was
foreseeable that he would operate the vehicle in a manner causing an unreasonable
risk of harm to others.6 Therefore, the district court's interpretation of South
Carolina's negligent entrustment law is consistent with the Restatement because it
recognized a broader standard of liability for negligent entrustment that
encompassed more than intoxicated drivers.77
In American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Passmore,78 the South Carolina
Supreme Court emphasized the element of control in negligent entrustment cases.79
In this case, Foxworth added Reed's car to his insurance policy when Reed could
not obtain liability insurance.8" While driving Reed's car, Reed's girlfriend collided
with Passmore, the plaintiff.8 The court reversed the trial court's finding that
Foxworth had an insurable interest under the theory that he had negligently
entrusted the car to Reed.82 Importantly, the court clearly articulated the "theory of
negligent entrustment"83 as providing that "the owner or one in control of the
vehicle and responsible for its use who is negligent in entrusting it to another can
be held liable for such negligent entrustment."84 The court then noted that the
"[e]ssential elements" of the cause of action for negligent entrustment were absent:
"Foxworth did not own the car.... he did not have control over the car, and ... he
was not responsible for its use. '8 5 Because Foxworth did not have control of the
vehicle, he did not owe a duty to Passmore and could not be liable for negligent
entrustment. Thus, consistent with the Restatement standard, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of control as a prerequisite to
liability for negligent entrustment.
A federal district court also interpreted South Carolina's negligent entrustment
standard in Brantley v. Vaughan,86 a case involving an intoxicated driver, Vaughan,
who was driving an automobile owned by Flippen Brantley, the plaintiff, was
injured when Vaughan struck him.88 Though the court cited Passmore in imposing
a duty of due care in this situation,89 it also purportedly adopted the test for
negligent entrustment from McAllister v. Graham, which is narrower than the
Restatement standard.9" The court held that the complaint satisfied both the
Passmore test and the narrower McAllister test, because the complaint specifically
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
78. 275 S.C. 618, 274 S.E.2d 416 (1981).
79. Id. at 621, 274 S.E.2d at 418.
80. Id. at 620, 274 S.E.2d at 417.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 621,274 S.E.2d at 418.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Bahm v. Dormanen, 543 P.2d 379, 381 (Mont. 1975)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
85. Id.
86. 835 F. Supp. 258 (D.S.C. 1993).
87. Id. at 262.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Passmore, 275 S.C. at 621, 274 S.E.2d at 418).
90. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 3 9.
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alleged that "Flippen owned the automobile which Vaughan was driving at the time
of the accident" and that "Flippen knew or should have known of [Vaughan's]
impairment."'" Therefore, Brantley "unquestionably demonstrated a possibility of
a right of recovery against Flippen. '9 2 If Flippen owned the vehicle, he had control
and a duty of due care under Passmore, which would be breached if he entrusted
his vehicle to an impaired driver.93 If the court had actually considered Brantley's
claim under the narrow McAllister test-which the court claimed to
follow instead ofthe Restatement standard,94 it could not have found for Brantley.
Brantley did not allege Flippen knew Vaughan was either addicted to intoxicants
or in the habit of drinking.95 Thus, the court apparently analyzed the claim under
a negligent entrustment standard consistent with the Restatement.96 Furthermore,
this case illustrates the importance of control in imposing a duty of due care, a
prerequisite to liability under South Carolina's negligent entrustment standard.
2. Other Chattel
The South Carolina Supreme Court has not limited the application of the
control principle to automobiles. In Howell v. Hairston," the court employed
negligent entrustment analysis to impose liability on parents who entrusted an air
rifle to their minor child.98 The Hairstons purchased an air rifle for their son who
had a reputation as a bully and displayed "aggressive and malicious tendencies. '99
The Hairstons lived in close proximity to a playground neighborhood children
regularly used.' ° When his parents were away from home, the child took his air
rifle to the park where he shot another child in the eye.'' The other child's parents
sued the Hairstons, alleging negligence "in entrusting the air rifle to their son when
they knew or should have known that... he was likely to fire the air rifle at other
children.' ' 2
In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the court found the
Hairstons "knew that under the circumstances their son should not have been
allowed unsupervised possession of an air rifle."'0 3 On the issue of "whether the
parents knew or should have known the reputation oftheir child,"'0' 4 the court stated
that the evidence must show "that a prudent parent would not have entrusted [the
child] with an air rifle under the same or similar circumstances."'0 5 Based on the
91. Brantley, 835 F. Supp. at 260.
92. Id. at 262.
93. See Passmore, 275 S.C. at 621, 274 S.E.2d at 418.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 8 9.
95. See Brantley, 835 F. Supp. at 260.
96. Compare id. at 262, with text accompanying notes 13-17.
97. 261 S.C. 292, 199 S.E.2d 766 (1973).
98. Id. at 298 99, 199 S.E.2d at 768 69.
99. Id. at 296-97, 199 S.E.2d at 768.
100. Id. at 297, 199 S.E.2d at 768.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 296, 199 S.E.2d at 767 68.
103. Id. at 297, 199 S.E.2d at 768.
104. Id. at 298, 199 S.E.2d at 768.
105. Id. at 298, 199 S.E.2d at 769.
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facts of the case, the court held that "the Hairstons failed to act as reasonably
prudent parents."'
06
The Howell court, in effect, applied the standard of Restatement sections 308
and 390.107 Because the Hairstons had control over the air rifle, they had a duty of
due care in exercising that control.' ° Given Mrs. Hairston's statement to the other
child's father that she tried to get her husband to store the air rifle in the attic
"before someone got hurt," the jury could infer that the Hairstons knew they should
not have entrusted their son with the air rifle.'0 9 Thus, the Hairstons breached their
duty of care. Furthermore, the facts parallel the language of section 390: the parents
knew their son was likely, "because of his youth, inexperience, or
otherwise"' 0 Li.e., his age and malicious tendencies-to endanger others with the
air rifle."' Indeed, the court, using language very similar to the Restatement,
recognized that the case was based on the theory that the air rifle was "negligently
entrusted by the defendants to a person who, on account of his youth and want of
experience, was incapable of evaluating the danger[s] incident to its use."' 2
Additionally, in Mitchell v. Bazzle, 1 3 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
emphasized the element of control to hold a landlord not liable for "injuries caused
by a tenant's dog."' '4 Peebles, one of the defendants, owned a company that owned
a mobile home park and rented mobile homes."' Mitchell, who had a minor
daughter, rented one of the mobile homes from Peebles." 6 Bazzle, also a defendant,
lived near Mitchell and owned a "vicious" dog that he kept inside of a fence."'
Mitchell's daughter was playing in the lot adjoining Bazzle's when Bazzle's dog
jumped the fence and seriously injured her." 8 The court of appeals found that
Peebles "knew of the dog's dangerous propensities... [and] had adequate time to
terminate" Bazzle's tenancy before the attack." 9 However, the court of appeals
found "no authority imposing liability upon a landlord based upon a theory of
negligent rental or entrustment of land." 20 The court also cited common law
precedent' 2 ' that did not impose a duty "on the part of a landlord to repair and keep
106. Id. at 298 99, 199 S.E.2d at 769.
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 390 cmt b, illus. 1 (1965) ("A gives a loaded gun
to B, a feeble-minded girl often, to be carried by her to C. While B is carrying the gun she tampers with
the trigger and discharges it, harming C. A is subject to liability to C."); supra text accompanying notes
13-15.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308.
109. Howell, 261 S.C. at 297, 199 S.E.2d at 768 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390.
111. Howell, 261 S.C. at 297-99, 199 S.E.2d at 768-69.
112. Id. at 301, 199 S.E.2d at 770.
113. 304 S.C. 402, 404 S.E.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1991).
114. Id. at 405, 404 S.E.2d at 912.
115. Id. at 403-04, 404 S.E.2d at 911.
116. Id. at 404, 404 S.E.2d at 911.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 405, 404 S.E.2d at 912.
121. At the time the court decided this case, South Carolina did not yet have a statute that imposed
a duty on a landlord to prevent injury to a third party for injury caused by a tenant's dog. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 27-40-440(a)(2) (2007); Fair v. United States, 334 S.C. 321, 323, 513 S.E.2d 616, 617 (1999)
(holding that a landlord is only liable under section 440(a)(2) for "defects relating to the inherent
physical state of the leased premises").
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in safe condition leased residential premises under the control of the tenant. ' '122
Because Peebles was Mitchell's landlord and thus did not have control of the leased
property, the court found that he did not owe a duty to Mitchell. 123 Therefore, it was
not negligent for Peebles to permit Bazzle to keep a vicious dog near children even
though Peebles knew the dog created an unreasonable risk of harm.
Then, in Dennis v. Timmons, 124 a case involving physical injury from a
screwdriver, the South Carolina Court of Appeals applied negligent entrustment
principles to hold the owners of the property on which the accident occurred not
liable. 125 After repairs to their mobile home, the Weeks left a screwdriver out when
they put away their tools. 126 Dennis and Timmons, both young children, came to the
Weeks's home to play with the Weeks's children. 127 While playing, one of the
Weeks children retrieved the screwdriver from underneath the mobile home.
128
Timmons "tossed the screwdriver" at Dennis, whose eye was irreparably injured. 1
29
The court of appeals affirmed a directed verdict for the Weeks family. 3 °
Because a screwdriver is "not an instrumentality which is almost always
dangerous,'' 3' "the standard for imposing liability ... is whether the person [who
allowed access to the chattel] knew of the child's proclivity or propensity for the
specific dangerous activity which caused the harm."'3 2 Notably, the court's
statements are similar to the language of Restatement section 390'.. and impose the
duty to safeguard a chattel from use by an incompetent third party.'34 Unlike the
parents in Howell who entrusted their son with an air rifle, 3 ' "the Weeks did not
entrust the screwdriver, negligently or otherwise, to a person who, on account of his
youth and want of experience, was incapable of evaluating the dangers incident to
its use."' 36 Although the Weeks had control over the screwdriver, they did not
breach their safeguarding duty because they did not "furnish[] or negligently
permit[] [Timmons] access to an instrumentality (the screwdriver) with which he
would likely injure a third party. '
122. Mitchell, 304 S.C. at 405,404 S.E.2d at 912 (citing Conner v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 243
S.C. 132, 139, 132 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1963)).
123. Id.
124. 313 S.C. 338, 437 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1993).
125. Id. at 343, 437 S.E.2d at 141.
126. Id. at 339, 437 S.E.2d at 140.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 339-40, 437 S.E.2d at 140.
129. Id. at 340, 437 S.E.2d at 140.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 341, 437 S.E.2d at 140.
132. Id. at 341, 437 S.E.2d at 141.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); see also supra text accompanying notes
14 15.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 21 23.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
136. Dennis, 313 S.C. at 341,437 S.E.2d at 141.
137. Id. at 343, 437 S.E.2d at 141.
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C. Cases Stating a Narrower Testfor Negligent Entrustment
The South Carolina Court of Appeals first articulated a narrow three-part test
for negligent entrustment in McAllister v. Graham.'38 For liability to be imposed,
this test requires that a motor vehicle owner knowingly entrust the vehicle to a
driver who is "either addicted to intoxicants or ha[s] the habit of drinking" and that
the owner knows or should know is "likely to drive while intoxicated."' 3 9 Notably,
the court cited both Passmore and Nettles v. Your Ice Co., neither of which used a
test similar to the McAllister test, but provided no discussion of its reasoning for
using such a narrow test. 140 Passmore provided a much broader statement of the
negligent entrustment theory, 4' and Nettles provided an easy case for the court to
find negligent entrustment without articulating a test.'42 Given this inconsistency
between the McAllister test and prior South Carolina caselaw regarding the theory
of negligent entrustment, the court of appeals' rationale seems unclear.
In McAllister, Graham was a long-time employee of APAC, which provided
him with a company truck to drive between his home and job sites. 43 APAC
instructed Graham not to drive the truck while off duty and never to drive under the
influence of alcohol. 144 One evening after visiting his son, Graham collided with
McAllister, causing him personal injury; Graham was intoxicated at the time. 45 The
trial court found that APAC had actual or constructive knowledge that Graham had
been convicted of driving under the influence approximately ten years earlier.
46
However, the court of appeals affirmed summaryjudgment for APAC because "the
DUT conviction ... was too remote, in itself, to meet the test' 147 and there was
insufficient evidence to infer that APAC knew or should have known of Graham's
addiction to intoxicants or habitual drinking.
48
Although the court of appeals decision is correct under the Restatement
standard, its statements are troublesome because the Passmore court's theory of
negligent entrustment 49 is at odds with the McAllister standard. Whereas Passmore
contemplated only an entrustor's negligence in entrusting a vehicle,5 0 McAllister
emphasized an entrustor's actual knowledge of an entrustee's habitual abuse of
intoxicants.'' Thus, it appears that the McAllister court stated its test in terms of the
138. 287 S.C. 455, 339 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1986).
139. Id. at 458, 339 S.E.2d at 156 (citing Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621,
274 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1981); Nettles v. Your Ice Co., 191 S.C. 429, 436-38, 4 S.E.2d 797, 799-800
(1939)): see also supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (detailing the McAllister test).
140. McAllister, 287 S.C. at 458, 339 S.E.2d at 156.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 78 85.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
143. McAllister, 287 S.C. at 456, 339 S.E.2d at 155.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 456 57, 339 S.E.2d at 155.
146. Id. at 457, 339 S.E.2d at 155.
147. Id. at 458, 339 S.E.2d at 156; see also supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (detailing the
narrow McAllister test).
148. Id. at 458, 339 S.E.2d at 156.
149. See Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621, 274 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1981).
150. See id.
151. McAllister, 287 S.C. at 458, 339 S.E.2d at 156.
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facts, rather than the underlying theory, of the earlier Nettles case.' 15 2 However, the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Nettles did not set forth a test for negligent
entrustment for courts to apply in subsequent cases. Instead, it correctly concluded
that Your Ice "failed to exercise due care for the protection and safety of others"'
153
because it had control over a delivery truck, rehired an employee it knew to be a
habitual drinker, and entrusted him with the truck when it should have known that
doing so would cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others.154 Your Ice likely
breached its duty under any of the standards for negligent entrustment discussed
above.' Still, in light of the South Carolina Supreme Court's unambiguous
articulation of the theory of negligent entrustment in Passmore decades after its
decision in Nettles, the standard set forth in McAllister seems much too narrow.
In Jackson v. Price,156 decided during the same term as McAllister, the court of
appeals cited the McAllister test but did not discuss the test's application." 7 Davis,
the owner of the car involved in the accident, drank six beers in the seven hours
leading up to the accident; Price, the driver of the car, drank two or three beers in
the hour before the accident. 158 Davis allowed Price to drive his car because Price
"seemed sober,... was in better shape, and ... had driven safely earlier" in the
day.'59 Price drove into the oncoming lane to avoid a stopped car 6 ° and collided
with Jackson, who died instantly. 6'
Jackson's estate sued Davis and Price, alleging that Davis negligently entrusted
his car to Price, and the jury returned a verdict against both defendants. 6 2 On
appeal, the court of appeals cited the McAllister test for "the elements of negligent
entrustment" in South Carolina. 6 3 Without extended discussion of the test, the court
found that Davis had "negligently entrusted his car to Price in that even though
Davis knew that Price had consumed three beers within an hour and a half of the
accident, he permitted him to drive his car."' 64
Notably, the court of appeals provided no discussion of the first element of the
McAllister test: knowledge that the driver was either addicted to intoxicants or had
152. Even if the McAllister test only applies to negligent entrustment cases "where the claim is
based on the driver's alleged impairment due to alcohol use," Kayce H. McCall, Note, Lydia v. Horton:
You No Longer Have to Protect Me from Mlyself 55 S.C. L. REv. 681, 683 (2004), such a narrow
formulation is unnecessary. South Carolina's cases have consistently applied a broader standard
consistent with the Restatement, see discussion supra Part IIB, and the McAllister test may deny
liability to a deserving injured plaintiff where the entrustor knew the entrustee was intoxicated but not
addicted to intoxicants, see infra text accompanying notes 216-18.
153. Nettles v. Your Ice Co., 191 S.C. 429, 437, 4 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1939)).
154. Id. at 436, 4 S.E.2d at 799.
155. Compare supra text accompanying notes 8 9, with supra text accompanying notes 13 17.
156. 288 S.C. 377, 342 S.E.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1986).
157. Id. at 381-82,342 S.E.2d at 631 (citing McAllisterv. Graham, 287 S.C. 455,458, 339 S.E.2d
154, 156 (Ct. App. 1986)).
158. Id. at 378 79, 342 S.E.2d at 629 30.
159. Id. at 379, 342 S.E.2d at 630.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 378 79, 342 S.E.2d at 629 30.
162. Id. at 378 79, 342 S.E.2d at 629.
163. Id. at 381-82, 342 S.E.2d at 631 (citing McAllisterv. Graham, 287 S.C. 455,458, 339 S.E.2d
154, 156 (Ct. App. 1986)).
164. Id. at 382, 342 S.E.2d at 631.
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the habit of drinking.'6 5 Although it cited McAllister,166 the court actually applied
a broader test; the court held Davis liable for negligent entrustment because Davis
had control of his car and should have known Price was likely to drive it in a
manner that would create an unreasonable risk of harm.'67 Davis was negligent in
entrusting his car to Price regardless of whether Davis knew Price was either
addicted to intoxicants or had the habit of drinking. Therefore, although the court
of appeals purported to apply the narrower McAllister test, its reasoning in holding
Davis liable for negligent entrustment actually parallels the broader Restatement
standard.
168
D. The First Party Limitation on Negligent Entrustment
Although the Restatement contemplates a first party action for negligent
entrustment, 169 South Carolina does not recognize such an action.' 7 In Lydia v.
Horton, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision
and held that South Carolina's public policy, as well as its modified comparative
negligence system, bars an intoxicated plaintiff from recovering on a first party
negligent entrustment cause of action.' To highlight the policy considerations that
bar a first party claim and to show that these policies support adoption of the
Restatement standard, a brief discussion of the Lydia case is provided.
Lydia was intoxicated, and Horton, the owner of the vehicle involved in the
accident, entrusted his car to Lydia.'2 The court found that Horton "knew or, by
reason ofplaintiff's obvious intoxicated condition, should have known that [Lydia]
was incompetent to operate the motor vehicle."' 73 Lydia lost control of the vehicle
and hit a tree, causing him serious injury and rendering him a quadriplegic.' 4
The South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted Restatement sections 308 and
39017" and reversed the trial court's judgment for Horton.'76 Notably, the court
stated that "South Carolina has acknowledged that giving control of property, such
as an air rifle, can be negligent" and although not specifically labeled negligent
entrustment, "the same rationale is utilized in finding liability.""' Furthermore, the
165. See id.
166. Id. at 381-82, 342 S.E.2d at 631 (citing kcAllister, 287 S.C. at 458, 339 S.E.2d at 156).
167. Id. at 382, 342 S.E.2d at 631.
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 308 cmt. b, illus. 2 (1965) ("A lends his car to B,
whom he knows to be intoxicated. B's intoxicated condition leads him to cause harm to C. A is
negligent toward C."); supra text accompanying note 13.
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. c, illus. 7. This illustration contemplates
a first party action in a "lessee/lessor relationship where a third party is injured, which is not analogous"
to a "pure first party claim," like the one at issue in Lydia. See Lydia v. Horton, 355 S.C. 36, 39, 583
S.E.2d 750, 752 (2003).
170. See Lydia, 355 S.C. at 38, 583 S.E.2d at 751; McCall, supra note 152 (discussing first party
negligent entrustment and implications of the supreme court's decision in Lydia).
171. Lydia, 355 S.C. at 39, 583 S.E.2d at 752.
172. Lydiav. Horton, 343 S.C. 376, 379, 540 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 355 S.C.
36, 583 S.E.2d 750 (2003).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 385, 540 S.E.2d at 107.
176. Id. at 395-96, 540 S.E.2d at 113.
177. Id. at 382, 540 S.E.2d at 105.
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court observed that negligent entrustment actions often center on "the same
premise: an item may be used by someone who is, on account of his youth and want
of experience.... incapable of evaluating the dangers incident to its use."'
178
The court surveyed South Carolina's negligent entrustment decisions, noting
that the "cases are illustrative of the Court applying the underlying theory of
negligent entrustment in a situation other than an intoxicated driver."' 79 The court
cited six states that base their negligent entrustment cause of action on Restatement
section 390,180 and stated "[m]any of our decisions follow closely the logic of the
Restatement."'' However, in light of South Carolina's comparative negligence
system, the court of appeals "conclude[d] this case was decided prematurely" and
remanded the case for a comparative negligence determination.'82
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed,'83 finding that Lydia was more
than fifty percent negligent as a matter of law, thus barring his claim.' 84 Further, the
court declined to adopt Restatement sections 308 and 390 "on this set of facts.
'' 85
But the supreme court did not disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that
South Carolina's negligent entrustment decisions are in line with the Restatement,
stating that comment c to section 390 was "consistent with" its disposition of the
case.'86 Instead, the court grounded its decision in public policy. 87 The court
concluded that "the policy considerations which support the legal theory of third
party negligent entrustment are undermined by applying them to a first party cause
of action." 8 8 By examining its decision in Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc.,89 which held
that an intoxicated adult could not bring a first party action against a tavern owner
who violated the state's dram shop statutes, 190 the supreme court recognized that the
"essence" of that case and Lydia were similar: in both cases, a voluntarily
intoxicated plaintiff was "attempting to deflect the responsibility that should be
imposed upon himselftowards another."'' Further, the court recognized that athird
party claim provides adequate deterrence.1 92
178. Id. at 383, 540 S.E.2d at 106 (quoting Dennis v. Timmons, 313 S.C. 338, 341, 437 S.E.2d
138, 141 (CE App. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Id. at 382, 540 S.E.2d at 106 (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 383 84, 540 S.E.2d at 106 07 (citing Keller v. Kiedinger, 389 So. 2d 129, 132 (Ala.
1990); Joseph v. Dickerson, 754 So. 2d 912, 916 (La. 2000); Sharp v. Odom, 743 So. 2d 425, 430
(Miss. C. App. 1999); Splawnikv. DiCaprio, 540N.Y.S.2d615, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Meachum
v. Faw, 436 S.E.2d 141, 144 (N.C. C. App. 1993); Denby v. Davis, 188 S.E.2d 226, 229 (Va. 1972)).
181. Id. at 385, 540 S.E.2d at 107 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 395 96, 540 S.E.2d at 113.
183. Lydiav. Horton, 355 S.C. 36, 43, 583 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2003).
184. Id. at 39-40, 583 S.E.2d at 752.
185. Id. at 43, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
186. Id. at 40 n.2, 583 S.E.2d at 753 n.2. Comment c states that "one who is himself careless in
the use of the chattel after receiving it[] is usually in such contributory fault as to bar recovery."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. C (1965).
187. Lydia, 355 S.C. at 41-43, 583 S.E.2d at 753 54.
188. Id. at 38, 583 S.E.2d at 752.
189. 332 S.C. 90, 504 S.E.2d 318 (1998).
190. Id. at 93, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
191. Lydia, 355 S.C. at 42, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
192. Id. (noting that allowing a third party claim against a tavern owner imposes a duty on the
owner to use "Judgment and discretion," which the court did not believe would be exercised "less
prudently" if the owner could only be sued by third parties (citing Tobias, 332 S.C. at 92, 504 S.E.2d
at 320)); see also infra text accompanying notes 243 52 (discussing other public policy considerations
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The narrow McAllister test 9 3 does not serve the court's articulated policy of
holding an actor responsible for the actor's own negligence. Under the McAllister
test, an entrustor who would be negligent under the Restatement94 could possibly
deflect responsibility for a third party's injury if the entrustor did not know the
entrustee was addicted to intoxicants. Therefore, the South Carolina Supreme Court
has recognized that the policy goals that support denying a first party negligent
entrustment claim are consistent with the broader Restatement standard for third
party claims.
111. GADSON V. ECO SERviCES OFSOUTH CAROLINA, INC.
In Gadson v. ECO Services of South Carolina, Inc.,19s the most recent South
Carolina Supreme Court opinion regarding negligent entrustment, the court
declined to adopt Restatement sections 308 and 390 in a third party action based on
the facts of the case. 19' In doing so, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals,
which had applied Restatement section 308 and imposed liability for negligent
entrustment.'97 Without extended discussion of the appropriate standard, the
supreme court applied the McAllister test to determine that an employer was not
liable for its employee's entrustment of a company vehicle to a friend who had
consumed wine coolers and later caused an accident.' 98 Although the court would
be correct under either the narrow McAllister test or the broader Restatement
standard, the court's language implies that the standard in South Carolina is
narrower than it actually is. Therefore, in light of the preceding discussion of
negligent entrustment caselaw in South Carolina,' 99 and to demonstrate that Gadson
should be limited to its facts, an extended discussion of the case is provided.
Jenkins was an employee of ECO Services of South Carolina, Inc. (ECO), and
was driving ECO's truck the night of the accident.z° Instead of returning the
vehicle to his employer's office in Hilton Head, Jenkins drove the truck to
Hardeeville and picked up several passengers, including his cousin, John Jenkins
(John), and Gadson. z' Jenkins took them to a restaurant and then to a store where
John purchased "one or two wine coolers," which he shared with one of the
passengers, and then the group drove to Purrysburg Landing. 2 ' John drove back to
Hardeeville, ultimately losing control of the truck, causing injuries to several
passengers, including Gadson, who were thrown from the truck and injured. 0 °
supporting the court's decision in Lydia).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 8 9.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
195. 374 S.C. 171, 648 S.E.2d 585 (2007).
196. Id. at 177, 648 S.E.2d at 588.
197. Id. at 175 76, 648 S.E.2d at 587 88 (citing Gadson v. ECO Servs. of S.C., No. 2005-UP-
130, slip op. at4, 7 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2005)).
198. Id. at 176-79, 648 S.E.2d at 588-89.
199. See discussion supra Part II.
200. Id. at 174, 648 S.E.2d at 587.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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Gadson sued ECO and Jenkins, alleging negligence and negligent
entrustment.2 °4 The jury returned a verdict against the defendants, finding ECO
negligently entrusted the vehicle to Jenkins, and Jenkins negligently entrusted the
vehicle to John.2 5 Applying Restatement section 308, the court of appeals reversed
as to ECO's liability, finding ECO "neither knew nor should have known [Jenkins]
intended or was likely to use the truck in such a manner as to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to others."2 °6 However, the court of appeals affirmed the
verdict as to Jenkins, finding that Jenkins "knew or should have known John's use
of the vehicle was likely to cause harm," given the family relationship between the
two men and John's consumption of alcohol before driving.20
When Jenkins appealed, the supreme court cited to Jackson v. Price for the
McAllister test for negligent entrustment. 20 8 After noting that the court of appeals
had applied a different definition of the cause of action based on the Restatement,
2°9
the supreme court "decline[d] to adopt sections 308 and 390 of the Restatement
based on this set of facts., 210 The court then concluded that the court of appeals
erred in finding Jenkins "knew John would cause harm because [he] knew John had
been drinking alcohol prior to driving the vehicle.,,2 ' The court also concluded that
the court of appeals erred in finding Jenkins knew John "would cause harm simply
because John was [his] cousin. 212 Specifically, the court found that
[t]he sole evidence supporting the claim for negligent entrustment
against [Jenkins] is the fact John had one or two wine coolers
prior to driving. Knowledge that a driver has had a drink or two
is a far cry from meeting the first element of negligent
entrustment that there be knowledge [by] ... the owner that the
driver was either addicted to intoxicants or had the habit of
drinking.213
Further, based on evidence that John consumed "as little as half of a wine cooler,"
there was no reason for either Jenkins or Gadson to know that John was
intoxicated. 214 Also, because there was no evidence Jenkins knew of John's
"drinking habits, driving record, or general behavior," it was error to assume that
Jenkins "was aware of John's character simply because [they] are cousins.",
2
1
5
Justice Pleicones, who concurred in the decision, would have adopted sections
308 and 390 "as alternative methods of proving negligent entrustment., 216 Justice
204. Id.
205. Id. at 174 75, 648 S.E.2d at 587.
206. Id. at 175, 648 S.E.2d at 587.
207. Id. at 175, 648 S.E.2d at 587-88.
208. Id. at 176, 648 S.E.2d at 588 (citing Jackson v. Price, 288 S.C. 377, 381-82, 342 S.E.2d 628,
631 (Ct. App. 1986)).
209. Id. at 176, 648 S.E.2d at 588.
210. Id. at 177, 648 S.E.2d at 588 (emphasis added).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 178, 648 S.E.2d at 589.
213. Id. at 177, 648 S.E.2d at 588 89.
214. Id. at 177, 648 S.E.2d at 589.
215. Id. at 178, 648 S.E.2d at 589.
216. Id. at 179, 648 S.E.2d at 589 (Pleicones, J., concurring).
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Pleicones identified a "loophole" in the majority's "current" formulation of the
elements for negligent entrustment: the test would not impose liability on a person
who allowed another to drive a vehicle "knowing that the driver was intoxicated"
but would only impose liability if the person knew that "the driver was a habitual
drinker or addicted to alcohol."' Justice Pleicones argued that "adoption of
sections 308 and 390 would eliminate this loophole."2 8 Still, Justice Pleicones
thought the case was correctly decided under either standard because there was no
evidence that Jenkins "knew or should have known that [John] was likely to operate
the vehicle in a manner which created an unreasonable risk of harm."2 19
Although Jenkins did not breach his duty of care under either the McAllister
test 220 or the Restatement,22' and thus application of the McAllister test was not
outcome determinative, the majority's opinion is still troublesome. The opinion
narrowly defines the standard of negligent entrustment without recognizing South
Carolina precedent applying a broader standard. For example, the court noted that
"[a]ccording to [South Carolina] case law, the elements of negligent entrustment"
are stated in the McAllister test.222 The court thus looked to two decisions by the
court of appeals for the elements of negligent entrustment without first considering
its own precedent in Passmore, where it cited a broader standard that is consistent
with prior caselaw and the Restatement.223 Additionally, the court concluded by
noting that the trial court should have granted Jenkins's motion for a directed
verdict because "[Gadson] failed to submit any evidence establishing the necessary
elements of negligent entrustment., 224 This statement seemingly limits the
doctrine's scope, implying that liability would not attach for entrusting an
automobile without knowledge of addiction to intoxicants or habitual alcohol use,
even where the entrustor knew the driver was intoxicated. However, South Carolina
has employed the negligent entrustment analysis in cases involving chattel other
than automobiles, 2 2' automobile cases not involving an intoxicated driver,226 and
automobile cases involving an intoxicated driver without requiring addiction to
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 8 9.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
222. Gadson, 374 S.C. at 176, 648 S.E.2d at 588.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 83 84.
224. Gadson, 374 S.C. at 179, 648 S.E.2d at 589.
225. See, e.g., Howell v. Hairston, 261 S.C. 292, 296, 199 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1973) (air rifle);
Dennis v. Timmons, 313 S.C. 338, 339, 437 S.E.2d 138, 140 (Ct. App. 1993) (screwdriver).
226. See, e.g., Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621, 274 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1981)
(holding that the "[e]ssential elements" of negligent entrustment were absent where the named insured
did not own or have control over the car and was not responsible for its use); Wineglass v. McMinn,
235 S.C. 537, 541, 112 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1960) (holding a defendant liable where the defendant's
employee left his fourteen-year-old assistant in the defendant's delivery truck with the keys in the
ignition and the assistant backed the truck into the plaintiffs car, injuring the plaintiff); Howle v.
McDaniel, 232 S.C. 125, 136-37, 101 S.E.2d 255, 261 (1957) (finding a bailor of an automobile with
a weak battery and headlights not liable for negligent entrustment where the defendant was injured after
colliding with the automobile).
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intoxicants or habitual alcohol consumption. 2 7 Therefore, the court's narrow
statements in Gadson are inconsistent with prior South Carolina precedent
recognizing a broader standard of negligent entrustment.
Interestingly, the facts of Gadson228 are very similar to those of Jackson,229
which the majority cited for the elements of the McAllister test 230 : both cases
involved a person in control of a motor vehicle who entrusted his vehicle to a
person who had consumed alcohol before driving,23 ' and in both cases the courts
defined the negligent entrustment standard narrowly.232 In Jackson the court of
appeals found the defendant liable for negligent entrustment233 under a broader
standard analogous to the Restatement, even though it cited the narrow McAllister
test.234 Conversely, in Gadson, the court found that Jenkins was not liable under the
McAllister test or the Restatement, because "[k]nowledge that a driver has had a
drink or two is a far cry from meeting the first element of negligent entrustment.
' 235
Hypothetically, if Jenkins had known John was intoxicated when he entrusted him
with the vehicle, the Restatement would impose liability while the McAllister test
would not. This distinction illustrates Justice Pleicones's loophole,236 which the
supreme court could close by adopting Restatement sections 308 and 390.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S DECISION TO ADOPT THE
RESTATEMENT STANDARD
In light of South Carolina's caselaw recognizing a standard of negligent
entrustment consistent with the Restatement,37 it may not matter whether its courts
adopt sections 308 and 390. However, to facilitate a standard consistent with prior
caselaw that applies in all negligent entrustment cases and to support South
Carolina's policy goals, the South Carolina Supreme Court should adopt the
Restatement sections.
Ultimately, only two negligent entrustment cases in South Carolina have
discussed and applied the first element of the McAllister test.238 In both cases, the
227. See, e.g., Pfaehler v. Ten Cent Taxi Co., 198 S.C. 476, 486-87, 18 S.E.2d 331, 336 (1942)
(holding a taxi company liable for its employee's negligence in placing an intoxicated passenger in his
cab with the keys in the ignition and leaving the cab, thus allowing the passenger to drive the cab and
injure the plaintiffs).
228. See Gadson, 374 S.C. at 174, 648 S.E.2d at 587.
229. See Jackson v. Price, 288 S.C. 377, 378 79, 342 S.E.2d 628, 629 30 (Ct. App. 1986).
230. Gadson, 374 S.C. at 176, 648 S.E.2d at 588 (citingJackson, 288 S.C. at 381-82, 342 S.E.2d
at 631 ).
231. See id. at 174, 648 S.E.2d at 587; Jackson, 288 S.C. at 379, 342 S.E.2d at 630.
232. See Gadson, 374 S.C. at 176, 648 S.E.2d at 588; Jackson, 288 S.C. at 381 82, 342 S.E.2d
at 631.
233. Jackson, 288 S.C. at 382, 342 S.E.2d at 631.
234. Id. at 382, 342 S.E.2d at 631 ("There is evidence in the record that Davis negligently
entrusted his car to Price, in that even though Davis knew that Price had consumed three beers within
an hour and a half of the accident, he permitted him to drive his car."); see also source cited supra note
168 (noting an analogous situation illustrated in Restatement section 308).
235. Gadson, 374 S.C. at 177, 648 S.E.2d at 588 89.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 216 18.
237. See discussion supra Part Il.A-B.
238. See Gadson 374 S.C. at 177-78, 648 S.E.2d at 588-89; McAllister v. Graham, 287 S.C. 455,
458, 339 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1986).
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court found that the defendants were not liable under that test.23 9 However, under
the facts of those cases, the defendants would not have been liable under the
Restatement either.24 ° Additionally, in Jackson, decided the same year as
McAllister, the court, without discussion of the first element of the McAllister test,
held an actor liable for negligent entrustment despite his lack of knowledge that the
entrustee was addicted to intoxicants or had the habit of drinking.24" ' Furthermore,
South Carolina courts have articulated and applied broader standards consistent
with the Restatement before McAllister.242 Thus, courts have not uniformly applied
the McAllister test, and the test is inconsistent with prior caselaw.
In Lydia v. Horton, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that "the policy
considerations which support the legal theory of third party negligent entrustment
are undermined by applying them to a first party cause of action." '243 The court then
recognized that the policy goal of holding voluntary actors responsible for injuries
caused by negligence is undermined in a first party action where a plaintiff "is
attempting to deflect the responsibility that should be imposed upon himself
towards another." '244 Further, the supreme court stated that the public policy
considerations that govern the tort of negligent entrustment stem from "South
Carolina's regulation of the sale of alcohol"24 and noted that the "same policy
considerations" announced in Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc.2 46 apply.247 In Tobias, the
supreme court agreed with the court of appeals that the purpose of South Carolina's
dram shop statutes 248 is ,to promote public safety '2 49 and to "impos[e] upon the
tavern owner a duty to use judgment and discretion., 25" However, the court
disagreed with the view that a first party action would deter a tavern owner from
over-serving a plaintiff.25 ' Moreover, the court continued to allow third party
actions, stating that it did not believe "the owner will exercise ... judgment and
discretion [in serving intoxicated patrons] less prudently if he risks a law suit only
when the intoxicated person injures others." '252 Given the decision by the court to
allow third party actions, South Carolina's standard for third party negligent
239. See Gadson, 374 S.C. at 178-79, 648 S.E.2d at 589; McAllister, 287 S.C. at 458-59, 339
S.E.2d at 156.
240. See Gadson, 374 S.C. at 179, 648 S.E.2d at 589 (Pleicones, J., concurring).
241. See Jackson v. Price, 288 S.C. 377, 382, 342 S.E.2d 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1986).
242. See, e.g., Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621,274 S.E.2d 416, 418 (198 1)
("[An] owner or one in control of [a] vehicle and responsible for its use who is negligent in entrusting
it to another can be held liable for such negligent entrustment." (quoting Bahm v. Dormanen, 543 P.2d
379, 381 (Mont. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)): Howle v. McDaniel, 232 S.C. 125, 132,
136-37, 101 S.E.2d 255, 259, 261 (1957) (providing that the owner ofan automobile will only be liable
for entrusting a vehicle to another when the owner entrusts the "automobile to one whom he knows to
be so reckless or incompetent that danger to third persons would be a reasonably probable consequence
of his operation of it").
243. 355 S.C. 36, 38, 583 S.E.2d 750, 752 (2003).
244. Id. at 42-43, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
245. Id. at 41, 583 S.E.2d at 753.
246. 332 S.C. 90, 92, 504 S.E.2d 318, 319-20 (1998).
247. Lydia, 355 S.C. at 42, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
248. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-580(2), -6-2220 (Supp. 2006).
249. Tobias, 332 S.C. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 319.
250. Id. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
251. Id. at 93, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
252. Id. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
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entrustment should further the state's policy goals of responsibility, public safety,
and discretion.
As a matter of policy, the McAllister test does not deter conduct that endangers
the general public because it only holds an actor liable for entrusting a vehicle to
another person only if the actor knows that the person is intoxicated and that the
person either is addicted to intoxicants or habitually drinks. 2 3 Thus, an actor may
escape liability under this standard even if the actor knows the other person is
intoxicated. Surely such a standard does not promote citizen responsibility, public
safety, or enhanced discretion. The Restatement sections do promote South
Carolina's policy goals. First, these sections hold a supplier of a chattel liable for
resulting injuries where the supplier knows or should know the person entrusted
with the chattel is likely to use it in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of
harm, regardless of whether the supplier knows the other person's habits.2"4 If an
actor knows another person is intoxicated and still entrusts a vehicle to the other
person, South Carolina public policy requires the actor to be held responsible for
any resulting injury.2 5 Next, as illustrated by Justice Pleicones's articulation of the
McAllister test's loophole,256 public safety is not protected where actors are
permitted to entrust their vehicle to others they know are intoxicated, as long as
they have no knowledge of their entrustee's habits.257 Finally, through its broader
standard that requires actual or constructive knowledge of incompetence, the
Restatement furthers the policy goal of discretion by encouraging actors to use good
judgment when entrusting a chattel to another.2 8 Because almost all South Carolina
negligent entrustment cases have applied a standard consistent with the
Restatement,259 the South Carolina Supreme Court should adopt sections 308 and
390 to provide consistency in the standard and further the state's policy goals.260
Likewise, because the McAllister test contravenes South Carolina public policies
253. See supra text accompanying notes 216-18 (discussing Justice Pleicones's loophole); cf
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the importance of liability as a deterrent to wrongful
conduct). Indeed, a court might use this narrow test to deny liability when liability should be and would
be found under the Restatement.
254. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 308, 390 (1965).
255. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 1, at 5 ("[O]nce it has been determined that the
defendant's act was wrongful and that it has caused injury to the victim, then the presumption in favor
of liability is both useful and understandable ....").
256. See supra text accompanying notes 216-18.
257. Cf HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 1, at 6 ("One reason for making a defendant liable in tort
for injuries resulting from a breach of his duty is to prevent such injuries from occurring.") (emphasis
added). Thus, the wrongful conduct of drinking and driving is deterred less where the defendant's duty
is defined narrowly, as it is by the McAllister test.
258. See Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 332 S.C. 90, 92, 504 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1998); HUBBARD &
FELIX, supra note 1, at 7 8, 8 n.16 (discussing the role of the "calculus of risk" in making informed
decisions).
259. See discussion supra Part IL.A-B.
260. The cases involving a defendant's duty to safeguard a chattel from use by a third party who
might cause harm further illustrate that South Carolina has recognized the connection between control
and tort duties. Because the Restatement emphasizes the right to control a chattel as the source of the
duty, these cases also support adoption of sections 308 and 390. See supra text accompanying notes
21 23.
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announced in supreme court precedent,261 the holdings in cases such as Gadson
should be limited to their facts.
V. CONCLUSION
South Carolina has consistently applied a negligent entrustment standard
analogous to Restatement sections 308 and 390,262 even in cases other than those
involving automobiles and intoxicated drivers.263 In every case where the court
found liability, the defendant had the right to control the entrusted chattel.264
Moreover, the South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that when the
"[e]ssential elements" of negligent entrustment, like "control over the car" or
"responsib[ility] for its use," are missing, the defendant will not be held liable for
injury resulting from entrustment.2 6' Although a minority of South Carolina
decisions involving intoxicated drivers cite a narrower standard for negligent
entrustment,266 the large majority of cases recognize that where an actor has the
right to control a chattel, the actor breaches the corresponding duty of due care by
entrusting the chattel to a person the actor knows or should know will use it in a
way that causes an unreasonable risk of harm to others.267
However, McAllister and Gadson present two exceptions to use of the general
standard, as they are the only two cases to discuss and apply the first element of the
narrow McAllister test. In both cases the defendants did not breach their duty even
under the broader Restatement standard, and thus, it is unclear what purpose the
McAllister test advances. It is clear, however, that the McAllister test creates a
loophole2 68 that does not further the important South Carolina policy goals of
citizen responsibility, public safety, and informed judgment and discretion.
Finally, because South Carolina's courts have applied a standard consistent
with the Restatement in a majority of negligent entrustment cases, the supreme
court's overly broad language in Gadson regarding the duty and the elements of the
261. See Lydia v. Horton, 355 S.C. 36, 42-43, 583 S.E.2d 750, 753 74 (2003); Tobias v. Sports
Club, Inc., 332 S.C. 90, 92-93, 504 S.E.2d 318, 319-20 (1998).
262. See discussion supra Part lI.B. South Carolina has also recognized the importance of a
defendant's right to control a chattel in creating a duty of due care to safeguard the chattel from use by
a person who might cause harm. See supra text accompanying notes 21 23.
263. See cases cited supra notes 19-20.
264. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
265. Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621,274 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1981). Notably,
the theory of negligent entrustment in Passmore is quoted from Bahm v. Dormanen, 543 P.2d 379, 381
(Mont. 1975), a case involving an intoxicated driver that explicitly recognized the importance of control
in creating the defendant's duty of due care in entrustment. Passmore, 275 S.C. at 621, 274 S.E.2d at
418. In Bahm, Tripp loaned a truck to the defendant and the defendant's friend, and the defendant's
friend drove the truck while intoxicated and injured the plaintiff Bahm, 543 P.2d at 380 81. The
Montana Supreme Court examined "the scope of the concept of control as it relates to negligent
entrustment" under Restatement sections 308 and 390. Id. at 381-82. Although Tripp loaned the truck
to both men, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant because he proved "the absence
of one of the elements of negligent entrustment the right of control over the vehicle." Id.
266. See discussion supra Part lI.C.
267. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 216 18.
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tort of negligent entrustment is inconsistent with its precedent. Thus, to facilitate
consistency and clarity in the law of negligent entrustment, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina should adopt Restatement sections 308 and 390, and the holdings
of cases like Gadson should be viewed in light of their particular facts.
Robert H. Mc Williams Jr.
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